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Abstract
Many interactive environments can be represented as games, but they are so large and
complex that individual players are in the dark about others’ actions and the payoff
structure. This paper analyzes learning behavior in such ‘black box’ environments, where
players’ only source of information is their own history of actions taken and payoffs
received. Specifically we study voluntary contributions games. We identify two robust
features of the players’ learning dynamics: search volatility and trend-following. These
features are clearly present when players have no information about the game; but also
when players have full information. Convergence to Nash equilibrium occurs at about
the same rate in both situations.
JEL classifications: C70, C73, C91, D83, H41
Keywords: learning, information, public goods games
1 Introduction
Many interactive environments can be represented as games, but they are so complex and
involve so many individuals that for all practical purposes the game itself is unknown to
the players themselves. Examples include bidding in on-line markets, threading one’s way
through urban traffic, or participating in a group effort where the actions of the other
members of the group are difficult to observe (guerrilla warfare, neighborhood watch
programs, tax evasion). In each of these cases a given individual will have only the
haziest idea of what the other players are doing but their payoffs are strongly influenced
by the actions of the others. How do individuals learn in such environments and under
what circumstances does their learning behavior lead to equilibrium?
In this paper we investigate these questions in a laboratory environment where the un-
derlying game has the structure of a public goods game. Players take actions and receive
payoffs that depend on others’ actions, but (in the baseline case) they have no informa-
tion about the others and they do not know what the overall structure of the game is.
This distinguishes our experimental setup from other “low-information” setups such as
Rapoport et al. (2002) and Weber (2003) who provide information about the structure
of the game but withhold information about the distribution of players’ types and the
outcome of play, or Friedman et al. (2012) who withhold information about the payoff
structure of the game but provide information about other players’ actions and payoffs.
The closest “low-information” set-up to ours is that of Bayer et al. (2013) who also
implement experiments without information about the structure of the game and about
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other players. However, their set-up purposefully induces a “confusion” element that the
game structure itself may also change. In our setup, the structure of the game, although
it is unknown to the agents, remains fixed and agents know that. Perhaps the closest
antecedent of our ‘black box’ treatments are repeated two-by-two zero sum games used
to test the early Markov learning models by Suppes & Atkinson (1959).1
As the game proceeds, all agents know is the amount that they themselves contributed
and the payoff they received as a result. Learning in such an explicitly repated game
environment is said to be completely uncoupled (Foster & Young, 2006; Young, 2009;
see also Hart & Mas-Colell, 2003, 2006;). In this setting many of the standard learning
rules in the empirical literature, such as experience-weighted attraction, k-level reasoning,
and imitation, do not apply because these rules use the actions of the other players as
inputs (Bjo¨rnerstedt & Weibull, 1993; Stahl & Wilson, 1995; Nagel, 1995; Ho et al., 1998;
Camerer & Ho, 1999; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Costa-Gomes & Crawford, 2006).2
Nevertheless our experiments show that learning ‘inside the box’ can and does take place.3
The learning process exhibits certain distinctive patterns that have been identified in
other settings. Two especially noteworthy features are the following:
Search volatility. A decrease in a player’s realized payoff triggers greater variance in his
choice of action next period, whereas an increase in his realized payoff results in
lower variance next period.
Trend-following. If a higher contribution leads to a higher payoff this period, the player
will tend to raise his contribution next period, whereas if a higher contribution leads
to a lower payoff this period, he will tend to reduce his contribution next period.
Similarly, if a lower contribution leads to a higher payoff the player will tend to
lower his contribution, whereas if a lower contribution leads to a lower payoff he
will tend to increase his contribution next period.
Learning rules with high and low search volatility have been proposed in a variety of set-
tings, including biology (Thuijsman et al., 1995), organizational learning (March, 1991),
1Note that subjects in that setting have only two strategies and were explicitly ‘fooled’ not to think
that they were playing a game. The observed learning in this setting follows reinforcement.
2Indeed most impulse-based learning models (see Crawford, 2013) except for reinforcement learning
(Erev & Roth, 1998) are thus excluded. We also note that social preferences cannot enter into subjects’
behavior because they cannot compare their own payoffs with others’ payoffs. Thus the black box
environment eliminates some of the explanations that have been advanced for behavior in public goods
games (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Fehr & Gachter, 2000, 2002; Fehr & Camerer, 2007).
3Oechssler & Schipper (2003) show that, in the context of 2x2 games, players can learn to identify the
other player’s payoff structure on the basis of their own payoffs and information about other’s actions. In
our set-up players may or may not learn the game, but even without information about the relationship
between their own and others’ payoffs they do learn to play Nash equilibrium. See Erev & Haruvy (2013)
for a recent survey of equilibrium learning.
3
computer science (Eiben & Schippers, 1998), and psychology (Coates, 2012). (In com-
puter science and organization theory this type of learning is known as ‘exploration versus
exploitation’, ‘win-stay-lose-shift’ or ‘fast and slow’ learning.) Search volatility is also a
crucial feature of rules that have recently been proposed in the theoretical literature;
in particular there is a family of such rules that lead to Nash equilibrium in generic
n-person games (Foster & Young, 2006; Germano & Lugosi, 2007; Marden et al., 2009;
Young, 2009; Pradelski & Young, 2012). To our knowledge, despite systematic differences
in behavior following positive and negative feedback being noted (e.g. Ding & Nicklisch,
2013), our model is the first experimental text of an explicit learning model with such
this feature.
Trend-following also has antecedents in the experimental literature, where it is sometimes
called directional learning (Selten & Stoecker, 1986; Selten & Buchta, 1998).4 Directional
learning describes behavioral dynamics based on local adjustments of strategy and aspi-
ration (Sauermann & Selten, 1962; Cross, 1983). The underlying behavioral components
are illustrated in a bargaining game: if a higher demand results in a higher realized payoff
the agent increases his demand, whereas a decrease in realized payoff leads to a demand
decrease (Tietz & Weber, 1972; Roth & Erev, 1995). Other experiments such as Erev &
Roth (1998) and Erev & Rapoport (1998) corroborate these bargaining findings and Nash
equilibrium is learned based on reinforcement dynamics in various settings. Recent the-
oretical generalization’s of directional learning when strategies are unidimensional have
been proposed by Laslier & Walliser (2011). Bayer et al. (2013) recover a directional
learning model in their learning condition even if the structure of the game potentially
changes.
In this paper we show that these two patterns help explain the behavior of subjects who
are learning in a ‘black box’ environment. Moreover, despite the lack of information
and the simplicity of the adjustment rules, the behavior of the group approaches Nash
equilibrium and does so at approximately the same rate as in the situation where subjects
have full information (Burton-Chellew & West, 2012). As we shall see, this is true
both when free riding is the dominant strategy, and also when full contribution is the
dominant strategy. We conclude that even when subjects have virtually no information
about the game, learning follows certain distinctive patterns that have been documented
in a wide variety of learning environments. In public goods games this behavior leads
to Nash equilibrium at a rate that is very similar to learning under full information.
Moreover, search volatility turns out to be a robust behavioral component even when
more information becomes available and when players gain experience.
4See Harstad & Selten (2013) for a recent survey of these models.
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The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the experimental set-up in
detail. In section 3 we present the empirical findings together with statistical tests of
significance. We conclude in section 4. An appendix contains experimental instructions
and supplementary regression tables.
2 Experimental set-up
Participants were recruited from a subject pool that had not previously been involved
in public goods experiments.5 The subjects were not limited to university students,
but included different age groups with diverse educational backgrounds.6 Each subject
played four separate contribution games, where each game was repeated twenty times with
randomly allocated subgroups. The twenty-fold repetition of a given game will be called
a ‘phase’ of the experiment. This yields a total of 236 games and 18,880 observations.
During sixteen separate sessions in groups of sixteen or twelve, subjects play the four
phases in a row.
Games differ with respect to two rates of return (‘low’ and ‘high’) such that either ‘free-
riding’ or ‘fully contributing’ is the dominant strategy. Treatments differ with respect to
the information that is revealed to the agents (‘black box’, ‘standard’ and ‘enhanced’).
Every player plays both black box games, and either the two standard or enhanced
information games. Either two black box games are played first, or two games of one
of the other two treatments.7 The two first phases constitute stage one, the second two
constitute stage two. Each possible information order is played in four separate sessions,
each of which with a different order of the two rates of return.8
In this section, we shall describe the underlying stage game, the structure of each repeated
game, and the different information treatments.
5The subjects were recruited through ORSEE (Online Recruiting System for Economic Experiments;
Greiner, 2004) with this request specifically made.
6The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All
experiments were conducted at the Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) at Nuffield College,
University of Oxford.
7Of the 18,880 observations, 9,440 are black box, 4,640 are standard, and 4,800 are enhanced.
8This yields sixteen different scenarios each played in one of the sessions given by the possible orders
and permutations; four (combinations) times four (orders) equals sixteen (sessions).
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2.1 Linear public goods game
Consider the following linear public goods game. Every player i in population N =
{1, 2, ..., n} makes a nonnegative, real-numbered contribution, ai, from a finite budget
B ∈ N+. Given a resulting vector of all players’ contributions, a = {a1, a2, ..., an}, for
some rate of return, e ≥ 1, the public good is provided, R(a) = e∑i∈N ai, and split
equally amongst the players.9 Given others’ contributions a−i, player i’s contribution ai
therefore results in a payoff of
φi =
e
n
∑
i∈N
ai + (B − ai),
where e
n
is the marginal rate of return. Write φ for the payoff vector {φ1, ..., φn}.
Nash equilibria. Depending on whether the rate of return is low (e < n) or high
(e > n), individual contribution of either zero (free-riding) or B (fully contributing) is
the strictly dominant strategy for all players; the respective Nash equilibrium results in
either nonprovision or full provision of the public good.10
2.2 Repeated game
In any session, the same population S (with |S| = 12 or 16) plays four phases. Each
phase is a twenty-times repeated, symmetric public goods game. In each period t of each
game, players in S are randomly matched to groups of four to play the stage game.11 The
budget every period is a new B = 40 to every player of which he can invest any amount,
but he cannot invest money carried over from previous rounds. The rate of return is
either low (e = 1.6) or high (e = 6.4) throughout the game.12 Write N t4 for any of the
four-player groups matched at time t, and ρt4 for the partition of S into such groups.
Given at, ρt4, N
t
4, in any period t such that i ∈ N t4 ∈ ρt4, each i receives
φi =
∑
t=1,...,20
φti =
∑
t=1,...,20
[e/4
∑
j∈Nt4
atj + (40− ati)].
For every i, φi represents a real monetary value that is paid after the game.
13
9If e < 1, R(a) is a public bad.
10When e = n, any contribution is a best reply to any level of contribution by the others, hence any
level of provision is supported by at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
11This follows the random ‘stranger’ rematching of Andreoni (1988).
12The Nash equilibrium payoffs of the stage games are 40 when e = 1.6, and 256 when e = 6.4.
13Hundred coins are worth £0.15 to pay £19.2 maximal individual earnings from the whole experiment.
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2.3 Information treatments
Before the first game begins, each player is told that two separate experiments will be
played. (From the analyst’s point of view the experiment consists of both of these taken
together.) At no point before, during, or in between the separate phases of the exper-
iment are players allowed to communicate. Depending on which treatment is played,
the following information is revealed at the start of each stage when a new treatment
begins.
All treatments. Two separate twenty-times repeated stage games are played. In each,
the underlying stage game is unchanged for 20 periods. Each player receives 40
monetary units each period of which he can invest any amount. Moreover, after
investments are made, each player gets a nonnegative return each period which, at
the end of each game, he receives together with his uninvested money according to
a known exchange rate.
Black box. No information about the structure of the game, or about other players’
actions or payoffs is revealed. Throughout the game players only know their own
contribution and payoffs.
Standard. The rules of the game are revealed including production of the public good,
rate of return, and how groups in the session form to play each stage game. In
addition, at the end of each period, players receive a summary of the relevant
contributions in their previous-period group; without knowing who these players
are and what payoffs they receive.14
Enhanced. In addition to the information available in the standard treatment, players
learn about the other group members’ previous-period payoffs.
Our main treatment is black box. Indeed, all our results concerning the learning rules
are based on black box data from sessions when black box is played first, in which case
subjects really have no knowledge of the structure of the game. For this reason, we
also required the recruiting system (ORSEE) to select only ‘first timers’ in public-goods
experiments. (See Appendix A for full black box instructions and Appendix B for the
output screens displayed during the experiment for each treatment.)
14This follows the standard information treatment design as in Fehr & Gachter (2002) and random
‘stranger’ rematching of subjects as introduced by Andreoni (1988).
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3 Findings
First, we analyze the black box data when players have no prior experience playing
public goods games in our experiments (or in other prior experiments). In this ‘black
box’ treatment, subjects have no knowledge of the structure of the game and receive no
information about others’ actions or payoffs.
3.1 Black box
In this section, we analyze the black box treatments when played before the standard or
enhanced treatments. Subjects were chosen only if they had not previously participated
in any public goods related experiment prior to ours.15 There were eight such sessions and
4,960 observations. By choosing these sessions, we ensure that players not only have no
explicit knowledge of the game structure and no information about others, but also have
no “experience” of related laboratory experiments that they could use to make structural
inferences. Unless stated otherwise, “significance” refers to a 95% confidence interval (5%
significance) when rejecting the null and to a 90% confidence interval (10% significance)
when the null cannot be rejected.
3.1.1 Contributions
For both rates of return independent of whether played first or second (phase one or
two), the mean initial contribution lies between one third and half the budget. The
mean is 15.3 in the games with e = 1.6, and 13.9 in the games with e = 6.4. Using
period-specific Mann-Whitney tests, we cannot reject the null of equal contributions for
games with different rates of return and for phase one versus phase two, that is, similar
observations are made in all games (with different rates of return) played in all initial
black box treatment games. This is evidence of “restart effects” (observed throughout
the literature).16 The period-two adjustments to the initial contribution have means close
to zero.17 Notably, a large part of these contributions lie at 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, with several
contributions made also in the range from 1 to 9; contributions at other numerical values
are rare.18 Using period-specific Mann-Whitney tests, we cannot reject the null of equal
contributions for different rates of return for periods 1 through to period 3.
15We used ORSEE to recruit our subjects with this ‘first timer’ characteristic. In Section 4, we will
test for experience and information effects by comparison with the rest of the data.
16See Andreoni, 1988; Croson, 1996; Cookson, 2000; Camerer, 2003.
17Means are 0.4 when e = 1.6 and 1.6 when e = 6.4.
18As is usually the case; see Camerer, 2003.
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Figure 1: Initial contributions (phases 1,2).
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Initial contributions often lie at 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, with several contributions made also
in the range from 1 to 9; contributions at other numerical values are rare.
(Figure 1 illustrates. See Appendix C, tables 4 and 5 for details.)
In the early periods of black box treatments, this is the behavior one would expect and
it is consistent with hundreds of previous experiments on public goods.19 Since players
have no knowledge of the differences in the game structures, they initially make ran-
dom contributions and play different games in much the same way. Note that players
initially contribute less than half of their budget, another observation consistent with
previous experimental results. A possible explanation for this is ambiguity aversion (Ep-
stein, 1999).20 At the beginning of the game, players cannot judge their initial payoffs
to be particularly “good” or “bad”, and therefore have no comparison concerning the
performance (“success” vs. “failure”) of different strategies. One would consequently
not expect an obvious direction for the initial-period adjustments, and indeed they are
similarly random until period 3 for the different rates of return.
19As surveyed, for example, in Chaudhuri, 2011.
20In Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, for example, mean contributions are ca. 40 percent of the budget; this
would mean ca. 16 in our experiment.
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Figure 2: Mean black box play (phases 1,2).
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Contributions deteriorate in the free-riding game. This trend is accentuated compared to
the full-contribution games which display a weak positive trend.
(Figure 2 illustrates.)
If players were not to learn at all, one would expect similar behavior throughout the
games. Using period-specific Mann-Whitney tests, however, we reject the null of equal
contributions for different rates of return in all periods after period 3. Moreover, play
evolves following distinctly different patterns: the contributions towards the end of the
game are closer to the respective stage game Nash equilibrium.21 Simple linear regressions
of contributions on a time trend (controlling for phase and group) reveal a trend of -0.6
when e = 1.6 (significant at 1%), and of +0.1 when e = 6.4 (significant at 10%). Note the
trend is accentuated in the games with e = 1.6.22 When e = 6.4, the mean contribution
never exceeds twenty and thus remains more than “halfway” from the Nash contribution.
Again, players’ ambiguity aversion may explain this phenomenon.23
21Means are 5.7 when e = 1.6 and 18.5 when e = 6.4.
22This pattern is consistent with previous experiments as, for example, noted in Ledyard, 1995. Note
our contributions decline more sharply than in Bayer et al. (2013), possibly indicating a “within-game
restart effect” in their experiments since players are lead to believe that underlying stage games are
changing.
23A contribution decrease represents less ambiguity and is, ceteris paribus, preferred by ambiguity-
averse agents, a contribution increase results in more ambiguity (Schmeidler, 1989).
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Figure 3: Final contributions.
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Final contributions amass close to zero in the free-riding game, and split between contri-
butions close to zero and 40 for the full-contribution game.
(Figure 3 illustrates. See Appendix C, table 6 for details.)
To summarize our observations regarding aggregate contributions in free-riding games,
we reconfirm the standard findings from the literature regarding initial contributions,
restart effects and contribution deterioration. Moreover, we note that in games where
full contribution is a Nash equilibrium, the observed trends to Nash equilibrium are
substantially weaker. Higher contributions seem harder to learn.
3.1.2 Difference in variation
Adjustment. The adjustment of a player i in period t is at+1i − ati.
Success versus failure. A player i experiences success in period t + 1 if his realized
payoff does not go down (φt+1i ≥ φti); otherwise he experiences failure.
Based on a Levene’s test (robust variance), the hypothesis of equal variances of adjust-
ments following success versus failure is rejected with 99% confidence.24 Furthermore,
we regress absolute adjustments on success versus failure controlling for phase, period,
individual, group, and two lags of contributions and payoffs. We obtain a significantly
(with 99% confidence) smaller coefficient of adjustment following success (by -1.2) than
after failure. The phase dummies are not significant. None of the period dummies is
significant after period 3. The two previous contributions are significant. The previous-
period payoffs are significant, those lagged two periods are not significant. We conclude
that players’ adjustments after successful contributions have a smaller variation than ad-
justments after unsuccessful contributions. As discussed in sections 1 and 2 of this paper,
24The robust variance test is not rejected dependent on whether e = 1.6 (mean -0.5) or 6.4 (0.2).
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Table 1: Adjustments after success and failure (phases 1,2).
statistic success failure
variance 123.9 188.5
mean +0.8 -1.2
SEARCH: the variance after success is lower than after failure; the average adjustments
are close to zero.
the phenomenon of “different adjustments following success versus failure” is a feature of
“search” in several recent learning models.25 Subsequently, we shall refer to this feature
as SEARCH.
(Table 1 summarizes. See also Appendix C, table 7 for details.)
3.1.3 Directional learning
Our games have the following structure, of which subjects in the black box are unaware.
First, despite knowing that they can make any contribution in the range from 0 to 40,
subjects do not know that the Nash equilibrium lies at either end. Second, an individual’s
payoff rises with the contributions of the other players but may rise or fall with his own
adjustment depending on the game’s underlying rate of return. Importantly, in varying
his own contribution, the individual agent is unable to distinguish between a self-induced
success versus failure, and one that is caused by others: in the interplay with others,
incremental adjustments in either direction may lead to higher or lower payoffs.26
The structure of the action space calls for a directional learning model (Selten & Stoecker,
1986; Selten & Buchta, 1998) based on success-versus-failure stimuli. Given period t, a
player i may increase or decrease his contribution relative to his contribution in the
previous period. As a result, he experiences either success or failure. Table 2 shows
the model of directional adjustments that we propose and shall subsequently refer to as
TREND.
To test the TREND hypothesis, given two subsequent payoffs, φt+1i and φ
t
i, we regress
adjustments relative to two lags of contributions (ct+2i − cti) and adjustments relative to
25See Young, 2009; Marden et al., 2011; Pradelski & Young, 2012.
26The effects that a player’s own actions and those of others have on one’s own payoff are important
features in Young, 2009; Marden et al., 2011; Pradelski & Young, 2012.
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Table 2: TREND hypothesis.
given success in period t given failure in period t
Player i in period t+ 1 (φti ≥ φt−1i ) (φti < φt−1i )
given an increase in period t increases contribution decreases contribution
(ati > a
t−1
i ) with respect to period t− 1 with respect to period t
given a decrease in period t decreases contribution increases contribution
(ati < a
t−1
i ) with respect to period t− 1 with respect to period t
previous contributions (ct+2i − ct−1i ) separately.
After success (φt+1i ≥ φti), we obtain significant coefficients in line with the TREND
hypothesis for adjustments relative to two lags of contributions (ct+2i − cti): we observe a
significant increase with respect to contributions two periods ago (+7.1; significant at 1%)
following an increase; and we observe a significant decrease with respect to contributions
two periods ago (-12.5; significant at 1%) following a decrease. The previous contribution
has a negative effect (-0.2; significant at 1%). All other coefficients are insignificant as in
the failure case. Trend following after success therefore summarizes as follows:
• If an increase is a success in the current period, the average next-period adjustment
relative to the previous period –net of negative level effects– is another increase.
Similarly, if a decrease is a success in the current period, the average next-period
adjustment relative to the previous period –net of negative level effects– is another
decrease.
After failure (φt+1i < φ
t
i), we obtain significant coefficients in line with the TREND
hypothesis for adjustments relative to previous contributions (ct+1i − cti): we observe
significant coefficients for decrease with respect to the previous-period contribution (-3.4;
significant at 1%) following an increase; and we observe significant increase with respect
to the previous-period contribution (+2.2; significant at 1%) following a decrease. None
of the phase or group dummies is significant. None of the period dummies after period
4 is significant. Past payoffs have significant but marginal (less than 0.05) effects. The
previous contribution has a negative effect (-0.6; significant at 1%). Trend reversal after
failure therefore summarizes as follows:
• If an increase is a failure in the current period, the average next-period adjustment
relative to the current period –net of negative level effects– is a decrease instead.
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Figure 4: TREND without level effect.
TREND without level effects: success versus failure leaves an intermediate range over
which predictions are ambiguous.
Similarly, if a decrease is a failure in the current period, the average next-period
adjustment relative to the current period –net of negative level effects– is an increase
instead.
Based on TREND, given two previous contributions and a success versus failure stimulus,
the location of the expected next-period contribution is known relative to the relevant
previous contribution, but, given the same two previous contributions, the relative loca-
tion of the contribution depending on success versus failure is unknown. This is because
TREND implies adjustment tendencies only with respect to the current period after fail-
ure, and with respects to the previous period after success. It is unclear where, given
both current and previous contributions, the next-period contribution will lie after either
success or failure is experienced.
(Figure 4 illustrates. See also Appendix C, table 8 for details.)
We shall illustrate this point with an example as illustrated in Figure 4, if an agent
contributes 10 in one period and 20 in the next, on average he contributes at least
10 if 20 was a success, and less than 20 if 20 was a failure. The following (stronger)
14
Figure 5: Average adjustment hypothesis (Bayer et al., 2013).
The average adjustment hypothesis ignores level effects and places further structure on
TREND, making predictions over the intermediate range where TREND remained am-
biguous.
hypothesis has been considered (Bayer et al., 2013): given two previous contributions,
the next contribution is, in expectation, closer to the contribution which resulted in a
higher payoff. If the stimulus is trend-neutral, the expectation lies exactly at the average.
As illustrated in Figure 5, if an agent contributes 10 in one period and 20 in the next,
on average he contributes at least 15 if 20 was a success, and less than 15 if 20 was a
failure.
(Figure 5 illustrates. See Appendix C, table 9 for details.)
We regress contribution adjustments on the four trends controlling for phase, period,
individual, group, two payoff lags, previous contribution. This yields the following ef-
fects:
given ati and a
t+1
i of some individual i, the net average adjustments, controlling for level
effects, are
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E(at+2i ; a
t+1
i , a
t
i)− a
t
i+a
t−1
i
2
= φti ≥ φt−1i φti < φt−1i
ati > a
t−1
i +3.6
∗∗ +0.3◦◦
ati < a
t−1
i −6.5∗∗ −1.9∗◦
∗∗: significant at 1%, consistent with the average hypothesis.
◦◦: insignificant, inconsistent with the average hypothesis.
∗◦: significant at 1%, inconsistent with the average hypothesis.
Note that the adjustments following success point in the “right” direction (following
success) and are significant. The adjustments following failure point in the “wrong”
direction (following failure) and are significant in case of decrease. As before, the previous
contribution has a significant negative effect of -0.4 (with 99% confidence). Previous
profits have a marginal but significant effect. If we drop the two payoff lags and the
previous contribution from the regression (since they are not included in the average
adjustment model), we improve in terms of the model’s predictions but not regarding all
aspects:
given ati and a
t+1
i of some individual i, the gross average adjustments, not controlling
for level effects, are
E(at+2i ; a
t+1
i , a
t
i)− a
t
i+a
t−1
i
2
= φti ≥ φt−1i φti < φt−1i
ati > a
t−1
i +1.4
∗ −3.3∗∗
ati < a
t−1
i −5.4∗∗ −0.9◦◦
∗
: significant at 5%, consistent with the average hypothesis.
∗∗: significant at 1%, consistent with the average hypothesis.
◦◦: insignificant, inconsistent with the average hypothesis.
We conclude that there is strong evidence for TREND including negative previous-period
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contribution level effects. Ceteris paribus, a higher previous-period contribution leads to
a negative adjustment. Depending on trend stimulus (success or failure), success trends
are followed with respect to the contribution two periods ago, failure trends are reversed
with respect to the previous contribution. The size of the adjustments relative to the
previous two-period average is ambiguous and depends on the level of the previous-period
contribution as well as the spread of the two previous contributions. A learning model
assuming average adjustments without level effects gives consistent predictions in the
success and increase directions; given a decrease-failure, however, it may lead to wrong
predictions. It is worth noting that in the context where the average adjustment rule
was originally formulated (Bayer et al., 2013), the problematic decrease-failure trends
are relatively rare because only games where free-riding is Nash are played. The most
common failure in those games comes from contributing more, not less.27
3.2 Experience effects
In this section, we analyze the whole black box data including sixteen sessions and 9,440
observations. In 4,480 observations, individuals have “experience” in the sense that they
play the black box games in the second stage having previously played a non-black box
treatment in the first stage where they received information about the game structure in
the form of detailed game instructions and about other players’ past actions (and payoffs).
Even though subjects are explicitly told that a separate experiment is started after the
first stage of the experiment, there is evidence that experience matters. This can be
explained by subjects linking the black box game to the previous voluntary contributions
games which seems reasonable given that payoffs will be similar and the action space is
the same.
(Figure 6 illustrates. See Appendix C, table 10 for details.)
First, we test for distributional differences in contributions using period-specific Mann-
Whitney tests for the two rates of return separately.28 The following observations are
made. In the initial period, restart effects are noted as previously. For both rates of return
separately, the null hypothesis of equal contributions dependent on experience versus no
experience cannot be rejected. Furthermore, there is no significant difference in between
the two rates of return which is natural since players have no basis to distinguish between
27Conversely, in the games where fully contributing is Nash, decreases are the more common failures.
28Appendix C also contains regressions that cluster on individuals for the initial period and all other
periods separately. The basic message being that there are significant differences if e = 6.4 but no
significant differences in the initial periods or if e = 1.6
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Figure 6: Mean black box play (phases 1,2 versus 3,4).
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Experience plays no visible role in the free-riding games. Experience has a positive effect
in the full-contribution games.
them.29 If e = 6.4, the null hypothesis of equal contributions dependent on experience
versus no experience can be rejected with 90% confidence after period 5 except for periods
16 and 17. If e = 1.6, it cannot be rejected in any period.
Second, we compare the linear time trends of contributions (Appendix C, table 11 contains
the details). Simple linear regressions controlling for phase and group reveal a similar
trend as before if e = 1.6 (-0.5; significant at 1%) but a stronger drift e = 6.4 (+0.3;
significant at 1%). Previously the respective trends were -0.6 (99%) and +0.1 (90%).
Indeed, the time trends are not significant from each other if e = 1.6, but the time trend
is significantly larger with experience than without experience if e = 6.4.30 Hence the
contributions in games with high rates of return improve faster with experience, but there
is no significant difference in play of games with low rates or return.
Finally, we perform the linear regressions with respect to SEARCH (absolute size of ad-
justments) and TREND (directional adjustments) from the previous section controlling
for the same effects and adding experience dummies for both rates of return. We obtain
29The initial contributions for both rates of return lie between 14 and 15 in all four phases of the
experiment.
30See Appendix C for the confidence intervals.
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the following results. The absolute size of adjustments (SEARCH) is smaller after the
initial two periods (all period dummies after period 3 are negative and significant), and
decreasing with experience. As before, the previous contribution is a positive and signif-
icant factor. Payoff level effects are significant but marginal. All other effects (including
phase dummies) are not significant. With respect to directional adjustments (TREND),
experience leads to larger contributions but the direction of adjustments is unchanged.
As before, the level of previous contributions is a negative and significant factor. All
period dummies after period 4 are negative. All other effects are as before.
We conclude that experience has two main effects. On the one hand, experience decreases
the SEARCH effect but preserves its sign. On the other hand, experience leads to larger
contributions over time when e = 6.4, but has no significant effect when e = 1.6. In
much a different setting, our findings complement the findings concerning experience
in games with low rates of return from Marwell & Ames (1981), Isaac et al. (1984),
Isaac et al. (1988) by analysis of games with high rates of return and by identifying a
common SEARCH feature when standard information is withheld. In fact, it turns out
that experience has a more significant effect in games where free-riding is not Nash (when
e = 6.4) in which case experienced players contribute more and learn Nash equilibrium
at a faster rate. A possible explanation for this is that experience reduces the agents’
perceived ambiguity of the game.
3.3 Comparison with information treatments
In this section, we shall investigate whether SEARCH and TREND are only features of
black box behavior or whether they persist in the standard and enhanced treatments,
that is, if players have explicit information about the structure of the game and others’
actions (and payoffs). We shall find that SEARCH is very robust and persists in all
treatments, while TREND is fairly robust but more sensitive to the treatment setting
and rate of return.
3.3.1 Distributional differences
Using period-specific Mann-Whitney tests we test for differences in contributions in the
three information treatments for both rates of return.31 It turns out that initial black box
contributions are significantly lower than non-black box contributions for both rates of
31This yields three tests for each period for both high (when e = 6.4) and low (when e = 1.6) rates of
return as summarized in Table 3.
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Table 3: Mann-Whitney tests of equal contributions.
comparison period
e = treatments 1 2 3 4 5 . . . 20
1.6 enhanced vs. standard = ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ . . . ∗∗
black box vs. enhanced ∗∗ = ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ . . . ∗∗∗
black box vs. standard ∗∗ ∗ = = = . . . =
6.4 enhanced vs. standard = = ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ . . . ∗∗∗
black box vs. enhanced ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ . . . ∗∗∗
black box vs. standard ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ . . . ∗∗∗
Significance: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%; =: not significant.
return. There are no differences in initial contributions between standard and enhanced
treatments but significant differences with the black box treatment.32 After period two,
all treatments are significantly different from each other in all periods except standard
and black box play when e = 1.6 which are not significantly different in any period.
When e = 6.4, standard treatment contributions significantly exceed enhanced treatment
contributions which exceed black box contributions. When e = 1.6, standard and black
box contributions are not significantly different from each other but exceed enhanced
treatment contributions. In the final period, of all three treatments, enhanced information
is closest to Nash equilibrium when e = 1.6, while standard and black box are closer to
Nash when e = 6.4.
(Table 3 and Figures 7 and 8 illustrate.)
3.3.2 SEARCH
Testing for SEARCH, we perform tests for each rate of return separately, clustering on
individuals and regressing absolute adjustments on black box, standard and enhanced
information effects. We make the following observations. First, (more) information leads
to less variation in adjustments in between time periods: for both rates of return, the
standard and enhanced treatment dummies are negative. If e = 1.6, the enhanced treat-
ment dummy is significantly more negative than the standard dummy. If e = 6.4, there
32Recall that initial black box contributions lie below 20 and show no differences for the two rates of
return (see section 3.1.1). Initial contributions are higher for both standard and enhanced treatments;
close to 20 when e = 1.6, and above 20 when e = 6.4.
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Figure 7: Mean play all treatments (black box, standard, enhanced).
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Figure 8: SEARCH and mean absolute adjustments (black box, standard, enhanced).
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SEARCH volatility is observed in all treatments; more information leads to less variation
in adjustments in between time periods for both rates of return.
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is no significant difference. In all treatments and for both rates of return, success in the
previous period leads to less variation in adjustments between time periods than failure
in the previous period.
3.3.3 TREND
Testing for TREND, we perform tests for each rate of return separately (with individual
clustering). We regress one-period and two-period adjustments treatment fixed effects
and on TREND, controlling also for fixed effects from experience and of two lags of
contributions and payoffs. We know that, overall, enhanced information leads to play
over time that gets closer to the Nash equilibrium than black box and standard treatment
play in the games with e = 1.6, while standard information play gets closer to the Nash
equilibrium than enhanced and black box treatment play in the games with e = 6.4.
At the TREND level, we observe a violation of TREND in two cases: i. when a contri-
bution decrease leads to a lower payoff (down and failure) in games with e = 1.6, the
expected next-period contribution is nevertheless smaller in both standard and enhanced
treatments (down is not reversed), ii. when a contribution decrease leads to a higher
payoff (down and success) in games with e = 1.6, the expected next-period contribution
is nevertheless larger in the standard treatment (down is not followed). The remaining
TREND components are preserved in a weak sense (pointing in the right way) in both
the standard and enhanced treatments even if some TREND components are no longer
statistically significant.
The remaining differences concern the size of the fixed effects and effects of earlier period
contribution lags. First, contributions two periods ago now are also significant (previ-
ously only contributions in the previous period but not two periods ago were significant).
With 99% confidence, the level of contribution two periods ago has a negative effect on
the contribution adjustments relative to two periods ago and a positive effect on the con-
tribution adjustments relative to the previous period. The constant for both adjustments
relative to one and two periods ago is negative in games when e = 1.6 and positive when
e = 6.4. This suggests longer “memory” effects in the non-black box treatments. The
standard and enhanced information fixed effects in terms of adjustments of contributions
relative to two periods ago are negative and significant (at different levels of significance),
and positive but insignificant for adjustments relative to the previous period. Experience
has no significant effects.
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3.3.4 Summary
Comparing black box with standard and enhanced treatments at a purely distributional
level, we observe the following differences. Initial contributions are higher in both stan-
dard and enhanced treatments (and not different from each other), and this finding
includes the games with e = 1.6 where such contributions are worse replies in terms of
the game’s Nash equilibrium. After period two, there are significant differences between
all three treatments when e = 6.4. When e = 1.6, there are no differences between black
box and standard treatments, and enhanced treatment contributions are significantly
lower. In fact, enhancing the information relative to standard treatments leads to lower
contributions in all games; these are higher than black box contributions when e = 6.4
and lower than black box contributions when e = 1.6.33
Let us also briefly summarize our results regarding SEARCH and TREND. SEARCH is
robust in all treatments. More information reduces the size of this effect but preserves its
sign. TREND including level effects is robust in black box treatments with or without
experience. Inside the box, adjustments are made dependent on whether the previous
adjustment was successful or not. There is only partial evidence for TREND adjustments
in the non-black box data and further contribution lags are significant. TREND fails to
explain non-black box adjustments, and subjects’ behavior is likely to interact and depend
on other factors such as social preferences and social learning.
4 Conclusion
Much of the prior empirical work on learning in games has focussed on situations where
players have a substantial amount of information about the structure of the game, and
they can observe the behavior of others as learning proceeds. In this paper by contrast,
we have examined situations in which players have no information about the strategic
environment, and they must feel their way based solely on the pattern of realized payoffs.
We identified two key features of such completely uncoupled learning dynamics – search
volatility and directional adjustments, both of which have antecedents in the psychology
literature. Search volatility in particular has not been examined previously in the context
of experimental game theory and turns out to be very robust even when players gain
33Decreasing contributions due to more information have previously been observed (Huck et al., 2011).
Indeed, this may be explained by considerations of relative payoffs. In both games, independent of the
Nash equilibrium, those who contribute less are relatively better off. This generally aids learning in the
games with e = 1.6 but may lead to an adverse learning effect in the games with e = 6.4.
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experience and information. Whether this remains true for other classes of games is an
open question for future research.
When no information regarding other players’ actions and payoffs is available and individ-
uals are limited in their computational capacity and memory, individual learning amounts
to trial-and-error type behavior. Outside game theory, these rules have a long tradition
dating back to Thorndike (1898) and constitute the heart of experimental psychology of
animal behavior processes. In our black box treatment, we enforce completely uncoupled
behavior in the context of public goods games played in the economics laboratory. The
key components of individual adjustments that we identify depart from traditional eco-
nomic theory in a way not captured by existing models of bounded rationality linking
reinforcement learning, directional learning and search volatility models.
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For online publication: appendices
Appendix A: black box instructions
Participants received the following on-screen instructions (in z-Tree) at the start of the
Black Box game and had to click an on-screen button saying, “I confirm I understand
the instructions” before the game would begin:
Instructions
Welcome to the experiment. You have been given 40 virtual coins. Each ‘coin’ is worth
real money. You are going to make a decision regarding the investment of these ‘coins’.
This decision may increase or decrease the number of ‘coins’ you have. The more ‘coins’
you have at the end of the experiment, the more money you will receive at the end.
During the experiment we shall not speak of £Pounds or Pence but rather of “Coins”.
During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in Coins. At the end of
the experiment the total amount of Coins you have earned will be converted to Pence at
the following rate: 100 Coins = 15 Pence. In total, each person today will be given 3,200
coins (£4.80) with which to make decisions over 2 economic experiments and their final
totals, which may go up or down, will depend on these decisions.
The Decision
You can choose to keep your coins (in which case they will be ‘banked’ into your private
account, which you will receive at the end of the experiment), or you can choose to put
some or all of them into a ‘black box ’.
This ‘black box ’ performs a mathematical function that converts the number of coins
inputted into a number of coins to be outputted. The function contains a random com-
ponent, so if two people were to put the same amount of coins into the ‘black box ’, they
would not necessarily get the same output. The number outputted may be more or less
than the number you put in, but it will never be a negative number, so the lowest out-
come possible is to get 0 (zero) back. If you chose to input 0 (zero) coins, you may still
get some back from the box.
Any coins outputted will also be ‘banked’ and go into your private account. So, your
final income will be the initial 40 coins, minus any you put into the ‘black box ’, plus all
the coins you get back from the ‘black box ’.
You will play this game 20 times. Each time you will be given a new set of 40 coins
to use. Each game is separate but the ‘black box ’ remains the same. This means you
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cannot play with money gained from previous turns, and the maximum you can ever put
into the ‘black box ’ will be 40 coins. And you will never run out of money to play with
as you get a new set of coins for each go. The mathematical function will not change
over time, so it is the same for all 20 turns. However as the function contains a random
component, the output is not guaranteed to stay the same if you put the same amount
in each time.
After you have finished your 20 turns, you will play one further series of 20 turns but
with a new, and potentially different ‘black box ’. The two boxes may or may not have
the same mathematical function as each other, but the functions will always contain a
random component, and the functions will always remain the same for the 20 turns.
You will be told when the 20 turns are finished and it is time to play with a new black
box.
If you are unsure of the rules please hold up your hand and a demonstrator will help
you.
I confirm I understand the instructions
Appendix B: on-screen output in each treatment
Supplementary Figures: the post-decision feedback information that participants re-
ceived: (a) in the black-box treatment; (b) the first feedback screen in both the standard
and the enhanced-information treatments; and (c) the second feedback screen, which
differed between the two treatments (not shown in black-box treatment). Dashed lines
border the information that was only shown in the enhanced-information treatment.
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Appendix C: regression outputs
Table 4: Section 3.1.1. Mann-Whitney tests for difference in contributions: period 1
Comparison # observations Test statistic (P-value)
1 if e = 1.6 124+124 -0.614 (0.5394)
1 if “phase”=1 124+124 -1.220 (0.2223)
We use black box data from phases 1 and 2. We test for differences in first-period
contributions under inexperienced black box play. We find no evidence for significant
differences depending on phase and rate of return.
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Table 5: Section 3.1.1. Mann-Whitney tests for difference in contributions: 1 if e = 1.6
Period # observations P-value (Significance)
1 124+124 -0.614 (0.5394)
2 124+124 -0.366 (0.7146)
3 124+124 0.099 (0.9213)
4 124+124 2.305∗∗ (0.0212)
5 124+124 3.300∗∗∗ (0.0010)
6 124+124 3.566∗∗∗ (0.0004)
7 124+124 3.369∗∗∗ (0.0008)
8 124+124 4.539∗∗∗ (<0.0001)
... ... ... ...
20 124+124 6.232∗∗∗ (<0.0001)
Significance: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
We use black box data from phases 1 and 2. We test for differences in contributions
under inexperienced black box play depending on rate of return. We find evidence for
significant differences for all periods after three.
Table 6: Section 3.1.1. Time trends of contributions
e = 6.4 e = 1.6
coefficient (std. error) coefficient (std. error)
Period 0.0831∗ (0.0514) -0.5561∗∗∗ (0.0404)
1 if “phase”=1 4.6486∗∗∗ (0.5937) -0.2628 (0.4675)
1 if “group”=2 -1.3031 (0.8345) 0.2734 (0.6492)
1 if “group”=3 -1.4063∗ (0.8345) 0.0016 (0.6492)
1 if “group”=4 -1.6472∗ (0.8545) -0.4944 (0.6728)
Constant 15.8716∗∗∗ (0.8479) 16.1658∗∗∗ (0.6676)
Observations 2,480 0.0247
Adjusted R2 2,480 0.0697
Significance: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
We use black box data from phases 1 and 2. We perform separate OLS regressions for
each rate of return of contributions on a constant and a time trend controlling for phase
and group effects.
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Table 7: Section 3.1.2. SEARCH: absolute adjustments following success and failure
Coefficient (std. error)
1 if “failure” 1.1914∗∗∗ (0.3768)
L.contribution 0.1948∗∗∗ (0.0129)
L2.contribution -0.0447∗∗∗ (0.0127)
L.payoff 0.0275∗∗∗ (0.0050)
L2.payoff 0.0094∗∗ (0.0050)
Individual fixed effects not listed
Periods 3, 13, 15, 16, 19 significant below 10%
others not significant
1 if “group”=1 -0.8012∗∗ (0.3908)
1 if “group”=2 -0.3644 (0.3919)
1 if “group”=3 -0.7581∗ (0.3922)
1 if “phase”=1 -0.0397 (0.2689)
Constant 3.3822∗∗ (1.6366)
Observations 4,464
Adjusted R2 0.2246
Significance: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
We use black box data from phases 1 and 2. We perform an OLS regression of absolute
adjustments on a dummy separating success and failure including a constant and
controls for two lags of contributions and payoffs, as well as phase, group, period and
individual fixed effects.
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Table 8: Section 3.1.3. TREND: directional adjustments relative to previous periods
One-period adjustment: Two-period adjustment:
coefficient (std. error) coefficient (std. error)
1 if “up” & “success” 0.1447 (0.5989) 7.0971∗∗∗ (0.7012)
1 if “down” & “success” -0.4467 (0.5431) -12.5189∗∗∗ (0.6359)
1 if “up” & “failure” -3.3727∗∗∗ (0.5428) 3.9860∗∗∗ (0.6356)
1 if “down” & “failure” 2.2309∗∗∗ (0.5901) -6.0167∗∗∗ (0.6909)
L.contribution -0.5823∗∗∗ (0.0150) -0.2114∗∗∗ (0.0176)
L.payoff 0.0204∗∗∗ (0.0053) 0.0189∗∗∗ (0.0062)
L2.payoff 0.0284∗∗ (0.0053) -0.0028 (0.0062)
Individual fixed effects not listed not listed
Periods 1-6 not significant 3, 14, 16, 17 not significant
7-20 significant at >90% others significant below 10%
1 if “group”= 1 0.5948 (0.4578) 0.5320 (0.5360)
1 if “group”= 2 0.6235 (0.4590) 0.2241 (0.5374)
1 if “group”= 3 0.4216 (0.4595) 0.3352 (0.5381)
1 if “phase”= 1 0.5553 (0.3150) 0.2149 (0.3686)
Constant 1.3711∗ (1.9914) 2.1540 (2.2943)
Observations 4,464 4,464
Adjusted R2 0.3175 0.2071
Significance: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
We use black box data from phases 1 and 2. We perform an OLS regression of
one-period and two-period adjustments on dummies for each directional success-failure
impulse including a constant and controls for two lags of payoffs, one contribution lag,
as well as phase, group, period and individual fixed effects.
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Table 9: Section 3.1.3. Bayer et al. (2013): average adjustment hypothesis
Coefficient (std. error)
1 if “up” & “success” 3.6210∗∗∗ (0.6086)
1 if “down” & “success” -6.4828∗∗∗ (0.5520)
1 if “up” & “failure” 0.3067 (0.5517)
1 if “down” & “failure” -1.8929∗∗∗ (0.5997)
L.contribution -0.3969∗∗∗ (0.0152)
L.payoff 0.0197∗∗∗ (0.0054)
L2.payoff 0.0128∗∗ (0.0054)
Individual fixed effects not listed
Periods 1-4 not significant
5-20 significant at 5%
1 if “group”=1 0.5635 (0.4652)
1 if “group”=2 0.4238 (0.4665)
1 if “group”=3 0.3784 (0.4670)
1 if “phase”=1 0.3851 (0.3201)
Constant 1.3711 (1.9914)
Observations 4,464
Adjusted R2 0.1522
Significance: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
We use black box data from phases 1 and 2. We perform an OLS regression of
adjustments to the previous two-period average on a dummy separating success and
failure including a constant and controls for two lags of payoffs, one contribution lag, as
well as phase, group, period and individual fixed effects.
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Table 10: Section 3.2: Regressions on experience effects with individual-level clustering
Period e = 6.4 e = 1.6
coefficient (std. error) coefficient (std. error)
1 Experience dummy -1.2964 (1.8648) -1.5014 (1.7455)
Constant 15.2661∗∗∗ (1.2987) 13.9032∗∗∗ (1.2408)
2-20 Experience dummy 3.6732∗∗ (1.4738) -0.1232 (0.8782)
Constant 18.2920∗∗∗ (0.9647) 9.8901∗∗∗ (0.5651)
Significance: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
We use black box data from phases 1-4. We perform separate OLS regressions with
individual subject-level clustering for each rate of return of contributions on a constant
and an experience dummies for the initial period and all subsequent periods.
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Table 11: Section 3.2. Mann-Whitney tests for difference in contributions: 1 if “expe-
rience” (“phase”>2)
Period # obs. e = 1.6 e = 6.4
(exp.+no exp.) test statistic (p-value) test statistic (p-value)
1 124+112 -0.851 (0.3949) 0.665 (0.5059)
2 124+112 0.069 (0.9448) -0.095 (0.9241)
3 124+112 0.960 (0.3373) -0.460 (0.6456)
4 124+112 0.041 (0.9671) -0.883 (0.3771)
5 124+112 0.685 (0.4933) -1.487 (0.1371)
6 124+112 0.659 (0.5098) -1.788∗ (0.0738)
7 124+112 -0.386 (0.6992) -1.957∗ (0.0504)
8 124+112 0.831 (0.4059) -2.680∗∗∗ (0.0074)
9 124+112 0.114 (0.9091) -1.812∗ (0.0701)
10 124+112 0.143 (0.8864) -2.049∗∗ (0.0405)
11 124+112 0.421 (0.6736) -2.203∗∗ (0.0276)
12 124+112 0.598 (0.5499) -3.068∗∗∗ (0.0022)
13 124+112 0.118 (0.9057) -2.696∗∗∗ (0.0070)
14 124+112 0.383 (0.7018) -2.833∗∗∗ (0.0046)
15 124+112 -0.791 (0.4289) -1.840∗ (0.0658)
16 124+112 0.416 (0.6774) -1.565 (0.1175)
17 124+112 0.364 (0.7160) -0.310 (0.7567)
18 124+112 0.730 (0.4652) -2.582∗∗∗ (0.0098)
19 124+112 0.442 (0.6585) -2.395∗∗ (0.0166)
20 124+112 0.306 (0.7597) -2.093∗∗ (0.0363)
Significance: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
We use black box data from phases 1-4. We test for differences in contributions under
black box play depending on experience versus no experience for each rate of return
separately. We find evidence for significant differences for most periods after five when
e = 6.4 but no differences when e = 1.6.
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Table 12: Section 3.2: Time trends of contributions: experienced play
e = 6.4 e = 1.6
coefficient (std. error) coefficient (std. error)
Period 0.2781∗∗∗ (0.0576) -0.5287∗∗∗ (0.0424)
1 if “phase”= 3 3.0366∗∗∗ (0.6639) -2.1152∗∗∗ (0.4887)
1 if “group”= 1 0.3516 (0.8783) -1.5640∗∗ (0.6465)
1 if “group”= 3 -0.9063 (0.8783) -1.1984∗ (0.6465)
1 if “group”= 4 -2.3734∗∗ (1.0757) -0.9359 (0.7918)
Constant 16.6344∗∗∗ (0.9280) 17.6383∗∗∗ (0.6831)
Observations 2,240 2.240
Adjusted R2 0.0199 0.0749
Significance: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
We use black box data from phases 1-4. We perform separate OLS regressions for each
rate of return of contributions on a constant and a time trend controlling for phase and
group effects.
40
Table 13: Section 3.3.2. SEARCH: absolute adjustments following success and failure
(cluster on individuals)
e = 6.4 e = 1.6
coefficient (std. error) coefficient (std. error)
1 if “failure” in black box 1.8871∗∗∗ (0.2905) 3.3866∗∗∗ (0.2698)
1 if “failure” in standard 1.8905∗∗∗ (0.3980) 2.7538∗∗∗ (0.3256)
1 if “failure” in enhanced 1.3157∗∗∗ (0.4061) 1.6046∗∗∗ (0.3177)
1 if standard -2.1746∗∗∗ (0.5149) -1.0574∗∗∗ (0.4130)
1 if enhanced -1.5261∗∗∗ (0.5797) -2.1255∗∗∗ (0.4337)
Constant 6.2599∗∗∗ (0.3475) 5.3123∗∗∗ (0.2415)
Observations 8,968 8,968
Adjusted R2 0.0184 0.0437
Significance: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
We use all the data. We perform a regression of absolute adjustments on a dummy
separating success and failure for each treatment and treatment dummies including a
constant with individual clusters for each individual and first two and second two
phases (accounting for experience) separately.
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Table 15: Section 3.3: Regressions on treatment effects with individual-level clustering
Period e = 6.4 e = 1.6
coefficient (std. error) coefficient (std. error)
1 Standard dummy 12.6973 (1.6095) 3.6790 (1.6285)
Enhanced dummy 10.9760 (1.6431) 3.5020 (1.5777)
Constant 13.1907 (0.8748) 15.8814 (0.9322)
2-20 Standard dummy 10.8300 (1.2291) -0.2050 (0.8458)
Enhanced dummy 4.5297 (1.3873) -3.1088 (0.8086)
Constant 20.0352 (0.7414) 9.8316 (0.4354)
We use all the data. We perform separate OLS regressions with individual subject-level
clustering for each rate of return of contributions on a constant and dummies for
standard and enhanced treatments for the initial period and all subsequent periods.
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